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Chapter 19 of the NAFTA:
Binational Panels as the Trade
Courts of Last Resort
The binational panel process of Chapter 19 will in many respects be the crucible
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As the vehicle for
resolving antidumping and countervailing duty cases brought in any of the three
contracting countries, Chapter 19 panels will be required to deal with the types
of trade conflicts that have historically generated intense, sometimes passionate,
controversy.
The Chapter 19 binational panel process is not new. Chapter 19 panels were
introduced in 1988 in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). At the
time, some regarded them as insubstantial innovations: the Chapter 19 provisions
creating panels neither adopted new substantive law nor established a right of
review that would not otherwise exist. Rather, those provisions provided that
Chapter 19 panels would serve simply as surrogates for reviewing courts and
decide cases in accordance with the same legal standards that courts would apply.
The experience with CFTA binational panels suggests, however, that notwith-
standing numerous parallels with the domestic courts they supplant, five-member
panels are obviously different from courts and create different dynamics in the
review process. The following summary offers a partial snapshot of how the
Chapter 19 panel process has operated under the CFTA during its first four years.
That picture may shed some light on how binational panels will operate under the
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NAFTA, which replicates the binational panel provisions of Chapter 19 without
significant change.
I. Basic Features of Chapter 19 of the NAFTA
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA establishes a trilateral process for "review and
dispute settlement in antidumping and countervailing duty matters."' In the U.S.
context this provision means that panels will review final determinations of both
the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission.
Thus, the binational panel review provisions of the NAFTA apply to those types
of trade cases that have dominated U.S. trade litigation and that have been perhaps
the most common form of trade dispute between the United States and Canada
and between the United States and Mexico.
The vehicles for review are five-member binational panels composed of panel-
ists from the two countries (or Parties) involved in the dispute.2 Panelists will be
drawn from a seventy-five-person roster developed by the Parties.3 All candidates
must be citizens of the United States, Canada, or Mexico. Although panelists need
not be lawyers, a majority of each panel, including the chairman, must be lawyers
in good standing. The NAFTA states that the roster "should include judges or
former judges to the fullest extent practicable." 4
When a Party requests panel review, the NAFTA entitles each of the two Parties
involved in the case to choose two panelists. Choices are subject to challenge by
the opposing Party. The involved Parties either agree on a fifth panelist or, if
unable to agree, select the fifth panelist by lot.
In reviewing antidumping and countervailing duty determinations, panels stand
in the shoes of the domestic reviewing court that would otherwise decide the case.
Panels must apply the same domestic substantive law that the administering agency
applies. The NAFTA defines substantive law to include "the relevant statutes,
legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedents
to the extent that a court of the importing Party would rely on such materials in
reviewing a final determination of the competent investigating authority."' Chap-
ter 19 panels are also bound to apply the same standard of review and the general
legal principles as would the reviewing court of the importing Party.6
The NAFTA binational panels must meet specific deadlines. Chapter 19 re-
quires the Parties to adopt implementing rules of procedure that will "result in
1. NAFTA Chapter 19, Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Matters. Actions taken under section 301 and other trade disputes are not subject to Chapter
19 panel review. Id. art. 1901(c)(1).
2. The NAFTA refers to the three contracting countries as "Parties" (initial capital). Participants
in a Chapter 19 proceeding are "parties" (lowercase).
3. Panel eligibility requirements and selection procedures are set out in NAFTA annex 1901.2.
4. Id. annex 1901.2(1).
5. Id. art. 1904(2).
6. Id. art. 1904(3).
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final decisions within 315 days of the date on which a request for a panel is
made." 7 For remands the NAFTA provides a less precise schedule, stating only
that "the panel shall establish as brief a time as is reasonable for compliance with
the remand, taking into account the complexity of the factual and legal issues
involved and the nature of the panel's decision." 8 A panel "shall normally issue
a final decision within 90 days of the date on which such remand action is submitted
to it."
9
Panel decisions on a particular matter are nonreviewable and binding as a matter
of law. The narrow exception to this principle, the "extraordinary challenge,"
is available only under unusual circumstances of gross misconduct, bias, breach
of fundamental procedures, or action that manifestly exceeds the authority panels
have been given.'
0
Beyond the review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations,
Chapter 19 contains additional provisions, a few of which differ from those in
the CFTA." Both the NAFTA and the CFTA provide that a Party may change
its antidumping or countervailing duty law as it applies to the other Parties, but
only if the statutory change is expressly applicable to the other Parties, the Parties
are notified in advance of the enactment of the changed law, and the statutory
change is consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the GATT Subsidies Code, or the GATT Antidumping Code, and "the object and
purpose of' the agreement. 2 Both agreements also provide for the establishment
of a binational panel to issue a declaratory opinion determining whether the
statutory change is inconsistent with the requirements of article 1902(2) or has
the function and effect of overturning a prior panel decision.' 3
II. Extrapolating from the CFTA Experience
Because Chapter 19 of the NAFTA is nearly identical to Chapter 19 of the
CFTA, the brief history of binational panel review under the CFTA may provide
some basis for anticipating how the NAFTA panels will operate. Such extrapola-
tion, however, is subject to some important limitations.
One caution is that the CFTA experience has been strikingly asymmetrical
in that CFTA panel decisions have overwhelmingly involved reviews of final
determinations made by U.S., not Canadian, agencies. In the first four and one-
half years of the CFTA thirty-one Chapter 19 panels and two extraordinary
7. Id. art. 1904(14).
8. Id. art. 1904(8).
9. Id.
10. Id. art. 1904(13); see infra part VIU.A.
11. See infra part VM.B.
12. CFTA art. 1902(2); NAFTA art. 1902(2).
13. CFTA art. 1903; NAFTA art. 1903.
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challenge committees were constituted. 14 Of those thirty-one panels, twenty-three
were formed to hear appeals from determinations of either the U.S. Department
of Commerce or the U.S. International Trade Commission.
The lopsided incidence of panel reviews simply reflects the relative number of
cases brought in the United States and Canada, respectively. Nonetheless, this
imbalance complicates any objective evaluation of Chapter 19 panels. For exam-
ple, some observers may attribute to the process factors that may more fairly be
attributable to particular cases or to the conduct of a particular agency. Similarly,
for those inclined to evaluate the process by tallying wins and losses for foreign
or domestic interests, a brief history dominated by cases from just one country may
be more susceptible to simplistic generalizations. Even a limited and asymmetrical
database, however, makes speculating about the NAFTA Chapter 19 panels less
daring than venturing predictions about the new NAFTA chapters that have no
CFTA predecessors.
ml. Are Chapter 19 NAFTA Panels Constitutional?
A threshold question now, as with CFTA, is whether the NAFTA structure of
entrusting the review of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations
to binational panels is constitutional. At the time of the CFTA's implementation
the chair of the House Judiciary subcommittee posed the issues as follows:
One, does the bill violate Article III of the Constitution by failing to authorize judicial
review, and second, does the bill violate the appointments clause. Also, does the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment require that some form of judicial review
be available to claimants in these countervailing duty cases and these antidumping
cases. 15
Some opponents of the CFTA argued that Chapter 19 is constitutionally infirm. IS
However, administration officials, constitutional scholars, and various represen-
tatives of the international trade bar all concluded that Chapter 19 offends no
provision of the United States Constitution. Following this debate, both Houses
of Congress approved the CFTA and adopted implementing legislation.17 The
14. Unless otherwise indicated, the statistical data appearing in this article derive from the Febru-
ary 1992 and March 1993 FTA Dispute Settlement Status Reports issued by the U.S-Canada Free
Trade Agreement Binational Secretariat, U.S. Section.
15. U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Libert-
ies, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988)
[hereinafter House Judiciary Hearings] (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
16. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 15, at 193, 206-08 (attachment to statement of Andrew
P. Vance, chair of Trial and Appellate Practice Comm. of CUBA) (Chapter 19 would deny equal
protection of law under 5th and 14th Amendments).
17. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (1990)); 134 CONG. REc. S12782 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1988) (Senate passage of bill); 134 CONG. Rc. H6665 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1988) (House
passage of bill).
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legislation contains, however, special procedures to be followed in the event of
a successful constitutional challenge.18
Two constitutional questions have been the most persistent.' 9 The first is
whether replacing judicial review with Chapter 19 panel review violates Article
III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which vests "judicial power of the United
States . . .in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." This question turns on whether the
cases heard by Chapter 19 panels are ones required by the Constitution to be heard
by an Article III tribunal. Such inquiry implicates a separation of powers analysis
that distinguishes adjudication of "private rights," which requires an Article III
court, from adjudication of "public rights," which does not. 20
A second constitutional question is whether replacing judicial review with
review by a panel consisting of persons who have not been appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate violates the Appointments Clause, Article
II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.2" Those who fault Chapter 19 on this score
argue that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo22 requires that
all persons "exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States' '-including, they argue, Chapter 19 panelists-function as officers of the
United States, who must be appointed in accordance with the requirements of the
Appointments Clause.23 In response the CFTA's defenders contend that: (1) the
Appointments Clause does not apply because panels act pursuant to international
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(B) (1988).
19. Most commentators accept that the earlier due process concerns regarding Chapter 19 have
been answered. See, e.g., Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of
Binational Panel Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1455, 1457 n.8 (1992) ("The commentary on the FTA has adequately addressed the
due process concerns raised by the FTA"); cf. Nat'l Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. United States,
No. 92-1898 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 9, 1992); see infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
20. See Gordon A. Christenson & Kimberly Gambrel, Constitutionality of Binational Panel
Review in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAW. 401, 416-19 (1989); Peter Huston,
Note, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Dispute Settlement Under the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement: Is the Process Constitutional?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529, 546-49 (1990);
Dave Resnicoff, Note, The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement and U. S. Constitution: Does
Article II Allow Binational Panel Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations?,
13 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 237 (1990); Gilad Y. Ohana, Note, The Constitutionality of Chapter
Nineteen of the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Article III and the Minimum Scope of
Judicial Review, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 897 (1989).
21. The Appointments Clause provides:
[The President].. .shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States
... ; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
22. 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution Provi-
sions of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299, 1302
(1992); Chen, supra note 19, at 1481 & n.185.
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law (the CFTA), not U.S. law;24 (2) U.S. panelists qualify as "inferior officers"
under the Appointments Clause and Canadian panelists need not qualify because
they act pursuant to Canadian law; 25 (3) the Supreme Court historically has not
subjected international arbitration to the requirements of the Appointments
Clause;26 and (4) U.S. courts traditionally defer to the President in the conduct
of foreign relations.27
Chapter 19 had been in operation for over four years when its constitutionality
was first challenged. The challenge came from an unexpected direction. In
August 1992, two U.S. trade associations with ties to organized labor filed
suit in U.S. district court against Chapter 19.2" Although neither plaintiff had
ever been involved in a Chapter 19 review, they argued that their members
were threatened by the process because it (1) gave panels composed of U.S.
and foreign private practitioners the power to reverse decisions of U.S. agencies
and (2) deprived U.S. victims of alleged Canadian unfair trade practices access
to U.S. courts. 29 The United States Government responded with a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, lack of standing, or both. 30 As of March 1,
24. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 15, at 78-79 (statement of M. Jean Anderson, U.S.
Dep't of Comm. (ABA Report)); id. at 126, 134-35, 166-67 (statement and attachment of Joseph
P. Griffin, chair of ABA Section on Int'l Law & Practice).
25. William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nisms: A False Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315, 1319-22 (1992).
26. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 15, at 79-80 (statement of M. Jean Anderson); id. at
105-06 (statement of Prof. Harold H. Bruff); id. at 167 (ABA Report).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936).
28. Nat'l Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. United States, No. 92-1898 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 9,
1992) (assigned to Judge Royce Lamberth). The plaintiffs claim that the district court has jurisdiction
variously under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988) (Administrative Procedures Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988) (federal question), 38 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988) (civil action arising under an Act of Congress
regulating commerce), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988) (Declaratory Judgment Act) and the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. They specifically do not argue for jurisdiction under
the constitutional challenge provisions expressly provided in the United States-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, § 401(c)(4), codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4) (1988).
Complaint at 3-4, Nat'l Council for Indus. Defense, Inc., No. 92-1898.
29. The plaintiffs specifically contend that Chapter 19 violates: (1) article I by ceding judicial pow-
ers to the binational panels; (2) the "Appointments Clause" of article II by vesting judicial power in
panelists without the "advice and consent" of the Senate; (3) article III by vesting judicial power in a
tribunal other than the Supreme Court or "such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish"; and (4) the Fifth Amendment by depriving plaintiffs' members and other citizens
of due process and equal protection of the laws. As relief, the plaintiffs ask the court to declare the
binational panels devoid of authority "to review, reverse, or modify" the decisions of U.S. trade agen-
cies and to declare the U.S. legislation that implements Chapter 19 to be "null and void." id. at 7-11.
30. The United States first argues that the FTA Implementation Act's express grant ofjurisdiction
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for review of constitutional issues concerning
Chapter 19 precludes the district court from entertaining this action under the various jurisdictional
and other statutory provisions cited in the complaint. The United States also argues that the plaintiffs
do not have standing to bring this case on two grounds: (1) no article III case or controversy exists
because plaintiffs have not shown any actual or imminent injury as a result of the defendant's actions;
and (2) plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they or their members are within the zone of interests
that Congress intended to protect by showing that they or their members meet the statutory requirement
(19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1988)) of an "interested party" eligible to pursue judicial or Chapter 19 review
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1993, the case has been briefed and is now awaiting decision on the U.S.
motion to dismiss.31
Many observers, this author included, believe that the constitutionality of Chap-
ter 19 will be upheld.32 At their core, constitutional challenges are based on
considerations of separation of powers-whether one branch of government im-
permissibly encroached on the designated prerogatives or functions of another.
The predicate for such concerns does not come into play, however, in the context
of the CFTA or the NAFTA, because both agreements were the result of collabora-
tive or joint action by the executive and legislative branches under section 102
of the Trade Act of 1974. 33 If the underlying balance of powers concerns do not
apply, or are muted, the strength of any constitutional challenge is significantly
weakened. 3
IV. The Dynamics of Binational Panel Decision Making
Although Chapter 19 panels simply "stand in the shoes" of domestic reviewing
courts, differences exist between five-member binational panels and the courts
they supplant. These differences do not affect the substantive or procedural law
that is applicable in panel proceedings-that law is the domestic law of the im-
porting Party. Not surprisingly, however, other differences do distinguish Chap-
ter 19 panels as unique fora with their own distinctive characteristics. With the
of an antidumping or countervailing duty case or to challenge the constitutionality of the Chapter 19
process under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4) (1988). Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Nat'l Council for
Indus. Defense, Inc., No. 92-1898.
31. Given the significant standing and jurisdictional objections raised by the United States Govern-
ment's motion, it appears unlikely that the district court will even reach the merits of the plaintiffs'
constitutional claims. Accord Morrison, supra note 23, at 1308 n.46.
32. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Can Buckley Clear Customs?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1309
(1992); Davey, supra note 25; Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 20; Thomas W. Bark, Note, The
Binational Panel Mechanism for Reviewing United States-Canadian Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Determinations: A Constitutional Dilemma?, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 681 (1989); House Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 15, at 147, 176; Memorandum from Congressional Research Service to House
Judiciary Committee, J. H. Killian, Possible Constitutional Objections to the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, at 222 (Dec. 16, 1987); cf., Morrison, supra note 23; Chen, supra note 19;
Karen H. Albright, Comment, Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement: An
Unconstitutional Preclusion of Article 11I Review, 5 CONN. J. INT'L L. 317, 328 (1989).
33. See United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, § 101(a).
Under the Trade Act of 1974 Congress authorized the President to enter into multilateral or bilateral
trade agreements to reduce or eliminate tariff or nontariff barriers; such agreements remain subject,
however, to congressional approval under special expedited, fast-track procedures. 19 U.S.C. § 2112
(1988).
34. Thus, the ABA Report concluded:
lt must be recognized that the FTA stands on strong constitutional ground. The FrA provisions at issue were
negotiated by the President pursuant to a delegation of authority from Congress and will soon be implemented
through legislation. It therefore is highly likely that a reviewing court would uphold this exercise of the pooled
authority of Congress (over foreign commerce) and the President (to negotiate international agreements that affect
the claims of U.S. nationals).
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 15, at 147; accord Davey, supra note 25, at 1326-27; Bruff,
supra note 32, at 1313-14.
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addition of a third legal tradition under the NAFTA some of the distinguishing
features will become even more pronounced.
First, when a panel stands in the shoes of a court, one obvious difference is
that there are considerably more feet. A panel of five judges is not the same as
a single judge. Like arguments before panels of three or more judges, the dynamics
of hearings before five-member panels frequently differ from single-judge hear-
ings. Five-member binational panels tend to be inquisitive. CFTA panel hearings
commonly last several hours or more. 3 5 Presumably the deliberative and decision-
making process of panels likewise reflects both the advantages and complications
of adjudicating as a panel.
Second, panels are heterogeneous, typically bringing together a variety of
perspectives. By definition, panels include two nationals of one country and
three of another. Since the NAFTA does not limit panel rosters to lawyers,
panels sometimes include economists or scholars. Because of a change to Annex
1901.2, NAFTA panels will also likely include judges. The results, sometimes
evident during hearings, reflect diverse interests that focus on different aspects
of a case.
Third, many NAFTA panels, like CFTA panels, will include practitioners with
substantial trade law experience and expertise. To such panelists issues that may
be arcane to lawyers or judges not specialized in the complex field of trade
law are readily understandable, in both legal and practical terms. This level of
expertise, not always available in an appellate court, can both inform the panel
and serve as an important check on counsel.
Conversely, two or three of the panel members will, if lawyers, have been
trained in the law of their own country, not the law of the country that they are
obliged to apply. Although they may be knowledgeable in the antidumping or
countervailing duty law of their own country, they will be navigating the jurispru-
dence of another country and possibly relying on their host country colleagues
on the panel. Nonlawyer panelists from either country will operate with whatever
burdens or advantages accompany that condition.
In the case of the NAFTA panels involving Mexico, panelists will be required
to bridge even wider cultural and legal gaps. Unlike both Canada and the United
States, Mexico is a civil law country, not a common law country. In addition,
Mexico does not have the trade law history and experience of either the United
States or Canada. Language differences will present new challenges generally not
encountered in CFTA proceedings. In these respects NAFTA panels will face
new complications.
One criticism of Chapter 19 CFTA panels is that panelists who are practitioners
may have conflicts if they have recently appeared, or may soon appear, before
35. The first hearing before the Live Swine from Canada panel, for instance, lasted over nine
hours, not including a break for lunch. Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03, 1992
FTAPD LEXIS 1 (Feb. 12, 1992) (Hr'g before the Panel).
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an agency that is a party in the proceeding before the panel.36 Indeed, at least four
proceedings have been suspended because panelists have recused themselves after
having been selected to serve on a panel.37 A recusal may be prompted, for
example, when a panelist realizes that an argument being made to the panel is one
that is also present, or could be, in a case in which she or he is counsel. Because
this particular risk of conflict is most likely to arise with practitioners serving as
panelists, it presents a trade-off with the greater expertise that practitioners often
bring to the panel process.
At the same time, other conflicts are arguably inherent in the existing process.
One of the most conspicuous conflicts is the multiple roles that the administering
agency must play. For example, during the course of an antidumping or
countervailing duty investigation the Department of Commerce must serve as
both active investigator and impartial adjudicator. When the department appears
before a Chapter 19 panel, it must become the advocate for the determination
it reached below. Conflicts among these various roles are most obvious when
a binational panel remands a determination. The agency, having just vigorously
argued the correctness of its finding before the panel, is obliged to return to
its role as agency decision maker and implement the panel's decision. Having
made a fresh determination, the agency must then return to the panel as
advocate-defender.
Finally, binational panels are binational. Panelists necessarily bring a binational
perspective to their specific Chapter 19 responsibilities. The international
agreement by which panelists are commissioned is dedicated to fair, reciprocal
treatment of the participating countries. The composition of the panel is itself a
constant reminder of the binational character of the process. Whether that trans-
lates into a more dispassionate, evenhanded resolution of the issues before panels
is a question on which panelists themselves may have the most informed view.
One striking statistic about the binational decision making of panels is that of
the twenty-one decisions rendered by Chapter 19 panels as of March 1993, none
has ever been decided by a vote divided along lines of nationality. Of these
twenty-one decisions, eleven have been unanimous.38 Panels have also issued four
36. The Code of Conduct for Proceedings under Chapters 18 and 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement establishes strict rules aimed at minimizing the incidence of actual or apparent
conflicts of interests among panelists.
37. Pure Magnesium & Alloy Magnesium from Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-04 (panel
suspended Jan. 27, 1993); Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-04 (panel suspended
Dec. 23, 1992); Certain Machine Tufted Carpeting Originating in or Exported from the United States
of America, Panel No. CDA-92-1904-01 (panel suspended Dec. 8, 1992); Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-01 (panel suspended Nov. 20, 1992).
38. Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-04, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (Aug. 26,
1992) (Dec. of the Panel); Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United States of America
by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery Company
for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia, Panel No. CDA 1-91-1904-02, 1992
FTAPD LEXIS 5 (Aug. 26, 1992) (Dec. of the Panel); Red Raspberries from Canada, Panel No.
USA-89-1904-01, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 5 (Dec. 15, 1989), 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 22 (Apr. 2, 1990)
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concurring opinions39 and six partial dissents.40 In perhaps the most acrimonious
case at the agency level-the ITC remand determination in Fresh, Chilled, and
Frozen Pork from Canada (USA-89-1904-1 1)-the proceeding was resolved by
a unanimous five-member panel and, thereafter, by a unanimous Extraordinary
Challenge Committee.
V. Speed
A principal objective of the compromise that became Chapter 19 of the CFTA
was the desire to see trade disputes between the two countries resolved expedi-
tiously. As articulated by the United States, the Parties designed the binational
panel process to achieve "quick resolution of [antidumping and countervailing
duty] issues between the two countries without unnecessary bilateral trade friction,
[while] preserv[ing] the rights of injured companies to obtain relief from unfair
trade practices." 42
To this end the CFTA sets forth a specific timetable by which panels are
required to proceed.43 The specified timetable is "designed to result in final
(Decs. of the Panel); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from
Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-02, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 2 (Jan. 24, 1990) (Dec. of the Panel);
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, Panel No. USA-
89-1904-03, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 3 (Mar. 7, 1990) (Dec. of the Panel); New Steel Rail, Except Light
Rail, from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-07, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 4 (June 8, 1990) (Dec. of the
Panel); Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-11, 1991 FTAPD
LEXIS 1 (Jan. 22, 1991) (Dec. of the Panel); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving
Equipment from Canada, Panel No. USA-90-1904-01, FTAPD LEXIS 6 (May 24, 1991), 1992
FTAPD LEXIS 2 (May 15, 1992), 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 7 (Oct. 28, 1992) (Decs. of the Panel).
39. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, 1990 FTAPD
LEXIS 12 (Sept. 28, 1990), 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 4 (Mar. 7, 1991) (Decs. of the Panel); Fresh,
Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-11, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 10 (Aug.
24, 1990) (Dec. of the Panel); Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United States of
America by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Company and the Stroh Brewery Company
for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia, Panel No. CDA-91-1904-01, 1992
FTAPD LEXIS 3 (Aug. 6, 1992) (Dec. of the Panel).
40. Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 1 (May 19,
1992), 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 8 (Oct. 30, 1992) (Decs, of the Panel); Certain Beer Originating in or
Exported from the United States of America by or on behalf of G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc.
and Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery Company, their Successor and Assigns for Use
or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia (Injury), Panel No. CDA-91-1904-02 (Feb. 8,
1993) (Dec. of the Panel); New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-
08, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 5 (Aug. 30, 1990) (Dec. of the Panel); New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail,
from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-09/10, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (Aug. 13, 1990) (Dec. of the
Panel); Integral Horsepower Induction Motors, One Horsepower (1 HP) to Two Hundred Horsepower
(200 HP) Inclusive, with Exceptions Originating in or Exported from the United States of America,
Panel No. CDA-90-1904-01, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 9 (Sept. 11, 1991) (Dec. of the Panel).
41. Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Binational Panel Remand Decision II, Article
1904.13 Extraordinary Challenge Committee, No. ECC-91-1904-O1 USA (June 14, 1991) (Extraordi-
nary Challenge Dismissed).
42. UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT, STATEMENT OF
REASONS, H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (July 26, 1988).
43. CFTA art. 1904(14).
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decisions within 315 days of the date on which a request for a panel is made."44
The NAFTA prescribes the same deadlines.45
Generally, panels have met these time limits. Even though panelists are geo-
graphically dispersed, of the twenty-one CFTA panel decisions to date, most have
conformed to the prescribed schedule.46 One reason that deadlines may not be met
is that a panelist has recused herself or himself to avoid an appearance of conflict.
47
As a result Chapter 19 binational panels produce decisions that, on average, are
much prompter than decisions produced by the U.S. Court of International Trade
(CIT).48
Delays in finally resolving Chapter 19 cases have resulted not so much from
panels failing to meet prescribed deadlines, but from the remand process. Article
1904(8) implies that the Parties to the CFTA and the NAFTA contemplated but
a single remand to allow for agency "compliance" with the panel's decision. 49
Both the CFTA and the NAFTA provide that a case is to be returned to the panel
following remand to an agency only "if needed" and only for a "final decision." 50
The absence of specific time limits for extended remand proceedings in either the
CFTA and the NAFTA or the implementing CFTA panel rules-coupled with the
agreements' stipulation that panels "establish as brief a time as is reasonable for
compliance with the remand' '-further suggests that the original conception did
not intend protracted remand proceedings. 5'
Delays through one or more remands may be traceable in part to the fact that
article 1904 empowers panels only "to uphold a final determination, or remand
it for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision." 52 This formulation stops
short of expressly authorizing panels to reverse agency determinations, even
where a panel finds an agency's action clearly to be legally erroneous or unsup-
ported by substantial record evidence. If, then, parties to a proceeding find an
agency's remand determination not to be in "compliance" with a panel's decision,
44. Id.
45. NAFTA art. 1904(14).
46. Of the 21 panel decisions, all but five have met article 1904(14)'s 315-day deadline for issuing
a decision. The exceptions are Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03, 1992 FTAPD
LEXIS 8 (316 days); Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-04, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS
6 (320 days); Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, 1990
FTAPD LEXIS 12 (402 days); New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-
1904-08, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 5 (363 days); and Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous
Paving Equipment, Panel No. USA-90-1904-01, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (344 days).
47. See, e.g., Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-04, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 6
(Panel dec. due Jan. 28, 1993; panel suspended Dec. 23, 1992, due to withdrawal of panelist).
48. See L.M. SHAMBON, AccOMPLISHING THE LEGISLATIVE GOALS FOR THE COURT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE: MORE SPEED! MORE SPEED! app. (Nov. 3, 1989) (on file with the United States Court
of International Trade, Sixth Annual Judicial Conference).
49. CFTA art. 1904(8); NAFTA art. 1904(8).
50. CFTA art. 1904(8); NAFTA art. 1904(8).
51. CFTA art. 1904(8); NAFTA art. 1904(8).
52. CFTA art. 1904(8); NAFTA art. 1904(8).
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more proceedings, including the possibility of further remands, are likely to
ensue.
CFTA panels have remanded to the agency in nine of the twenty-one cases they
have decided.53 Five of the nine have involved multiple remands.54 In those cases
the elapsed time from request for a panel to a final decision was not the 315 days
established in the CFTA, but ranged from 38351 to 92756 days. The longest-927
days-involved three remands. 7
The final potential source of delay is an "extraordinary challenge" to a panel
decision. Through the end of 1992 a Party had requested an extraordinary chal-
lenge in only one case. 5' The challenge committee decided that challenge within
seventy-seven days from the date the request for a committee was filed. 59 Thus,
final resolution of that case-from the first request for panel review to the day
the panel was dismissed-required a total of 612 days °
53. Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United States of America by or on behalf
of G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc. and Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery Com-
pany, their Successor and Assigns for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia
(Injury), Panel No. CDA-91-1904-02, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 5; Red Raspberries from Canada, Panel
No. USA-89-1904-01, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 22; Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel
No. USA-89-1904-06, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 12; Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous
Paving Equipment, Panel No. USA-90-1904-01, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 7; Live Swine from Canada,
Panel No. USA-91-1904-03, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 8; Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-
1904-04, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 6; New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from Canada, Panel No.
USA-89-1904-07, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 4; Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No.
USA-89-1904-11, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 10; and Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the
United States of America by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Company and the Stroh
Brewery Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia, Panel No. CDA-91-
1904-01, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 5.
54. Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 8; Red Raspber-
ries from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-01, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 22; Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 12; Fresh, Chilled or Frozen
Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-11, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 1; and Replacement Parts
for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, Panel No. USA-90-1904-01, 1992
FTAPD LEXIS 7.
55. Red Raspberries from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-01, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 22.
56. Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment, Panel No. USA-90-
1904-01, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 7.
57. Id. Panel No. USA-90-1904-01, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (May 24, 1991) (Panel Op. and
Order); Panel No. USA-90-1904-01, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 2 (May 15, 1992) (Panel Op. and Order);
and Panel No. USA-90-1904-01, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 7 (Oct. 28, 1992) (Panel Op. and Order).
58. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, No. ECC-91-1904-01USA. A second extraor-
dinary challenge committee was requested on Jan. 21, 1993, and delivered Live Swine from Canada,
No. ECC-93-1904-01 USA, its opinion dismissing the request, on Apr. 8, 1993, a total of 77 days
from start to finish.
59. The request for an extraordinary challenge committee was filed on March 29, 1991. The
committee issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order on June 17, 1991.56 Fed. Reg. 28,741 (1991).
60. The request for panel review was filed on October 13, 1989. The panel was discharged from
its duties on June 14, 1991. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,742 (1991).
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VI. Finality
In addition to speed, the twin objective of the Chapter 19 panel process of the
NAFTA is finality. Like the CFTA the NAFTA provides that decisions of Chapter
19 binational panels are binding on the contracting Parties, including the adminis-
trative agencies that are subject to panel review. Chapter 19 states that panel
decisions "shall be binding on the involved Parties with respect to the particular
matter between the Parties that is before the panel." 61 The United States empha-
sized the point in its Statement of Administrative Action for the CFTA: "It is vital
to the success of the Agreement that the implementation of panel and committee
decisions be guaranteed.",
62
Panel decisions are likewise nonreviewable. The NAFTA provides that agency
final determinations "shall not be reviewed under any judicial review procedures
of the importing Party if an involved Party requests a panel with respect to that
determination." 63 Thus, unlike decisions of the CIT, which are appealable to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Chapter 19 panel decisions are not
subject to further review. The only exception, one that parallels the rules of
finality for arbitral decisions, is the "extraordinary challenge. ,64 As discussed
in part VIII below, an extraordinary challenge is available only under such extraor-
dinary circumstances as gross misconduct, bias, or an attempt by a panel to take
action that is manifestly beyond the powers that panels have been given.
The NAFTA is accordingly unambiguous that the contracting Parties, including
the administering agencies, are bound as a matter of law to comply with decisions
of Chapter 19 panels. Not only are panel decisions binding on the contracting
Parties as a matter of international law. By virtue of the implementing legislation
carrying forward the provisions of the NAFTA (or, in the case of Mexico, self-
executing treaty provisions), panel decisions also will be binding on administering
agencies as a matter of domestic law, as they are under the CFTA. 65 The point
that panel decisions are binding is underscored by the language of Chapter 19
itself, which states that in the case of a remand, a panel shall allow "as brief a
period of time as is reasonable for compliance with the remand. '66
The early history of the CFTA includes, however, several cases that have
evinced agency reluctance to comply. In cases involving multiple remands, subse-
quent remands have often included increasingly specific instructions. This pattern,
61. NAFTA art. 1904(9).
62. UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (July 26, 1988).
63. NAFTA art. 1904(11).
64. See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) (If an award "is within the submission,
and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court
of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact.").
65. H.R. Doc. No. 216, supra note 62, at 267.
66. NAFTA art. 1904(8) (emphasis added).
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which finds parallels in U.S. case law dealing with recalcitrant agencies, is pre-
dictably most common in cases in which the agencies have been most resistant.67
In the early case of Red Raspberries from Canada, for instance, a panel was
presented with a remand determination that the panel considered to be "unrespon-
sive to the Panel's concerns. -6' The panel was thus presented with the arguably
competing considerations of its authority only to "uphold" or "remand" an
agency determination and the need to adhere to the CFTA objective of resolving
trade disputes promptly.
Agencies have also exhibited resistance to panel decisions in other cases and
have even volunteered criticisms of the reviewing authorities established under
Chapter 19. For example, the Commerce Department criticized the panel re-
viewing its final decision in the fourth administrative review of Live Swine from
Canada and announced that Commerce would not adhere to it in any other cases.69
Similarly, in Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork, the panel reviewing Commerce's
subsidy determination found that "there [was] no substantial evidence on the
record" to support Commerce's conclusion that a provincial government program
was countervailable.7 ° It remanded for "reconsideration. "7 On remand, Com-
merce again found the program to be countervailable, but did not present the
additional record support that the panel had requested. Finding "nothing...
which would support reversal of its earlier determination," the panel again re-
manded for Commerce "to conform its determination in accordance with the
decision of this Panel. 7 2 Commerce obliged to the extent of removing the pro-
gram from its countervailing duty calculations, but refused to find the program
not countervailable. 7
Perhaps the most extreme example of agency resistance was the sister panel's
review of an injury determination by the International Trade Commission (ITC)
in Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada. In the second remand determina-
tion in that case, the two-member majority criticized the panel decision, which
it characterized as "counterintuitive, counterfactual, and illogical, but legally
67. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (no remand is
required when it would unnecessarily "convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong
game"); Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Smith
Corona Corp. v. United States, 698 F. Supp. 240, 254 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Yuasa-General Battery
Corp. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 1551, 1555-56 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
68. Red Raspberries from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-01, at 3, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 22
(Apr. 2, 1990) (Dec. of the Panel).
69. Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03, at 3 (Dep't Comm. Nov. 19, 1992)(Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Panel Remand).
70. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, at 80, 1990
FTAPD LEXIS 23 (Sept. 28, 1990) (Mem. Op. and Remand Order).
71. Id.
72. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, at 20, 1991
FTAPD LEXIS 4 (Mar. 8, 1991) (Mem. Op. and Order Regarding Commerce's Det. on Remand).
73. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, at 2 (Dep't
Comm. Apr. 11, 1991) (Determination Pursuant to Remand).
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binding." 74 The opinion charged that the panel's action represented either "delib-
erate mischaracterization ... or a woeful lack of knowledge" and promised that
the ITC would not conform future agency practice to the panel's decision.75 The
ITC nonetheless complied with the panel's decision, and subsequent extraordinary
challenge to the panel decision was unsuccessful.76
The cases involving multiple remands and issues of finality reflect one clear
difference between Chapter 19 panels and domestic reviewing courts. Unlike
domestic courts, Chapter 19 panels are bound by the NAFTA or CFTA, which
is the authority by which they are created. They must accordingly consider their
own obligations in light of the explicit objective of the Parties to achieve finality
in decisions resolving antidumping and countervailing duty cases. As a result,
several panels have specifically addressed and sought to reconcile the arguably
competing considerations of limitations to their remand authority and their obliga-
tion to achieve final decisions in an expeditious manner.
In some recent cases, U.S. trade agencies have asserted that decisions of the
CIT are not binding on the agency.77 Agencies have also argued that binational
panel decisions are not binding precedents.78 However, in the context of a single
case-a "particular matter" before a panel-there is no question that the rulings
of the panel are binding as a matter of law. 79
The early experience of CFTA panels suggests that issues of finality may persist
in the NAFTA. On the other hand, the issue may well dissipate as Chapter 19
proceedings become more routine and the jurisprudence of extraordinary chal-
lenge committees is established. Agency resistance to Chapter 19 panel review
may prove to have been an unsurprising growing pain occasioned by a significant
innovation in bilateral dispute resolution. If such growing pains persist, however,
74. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. No. 2362, Inv. No. 701-TA-298,
at 19, 1991 FTC LEXIS 95 (Feb. 1991). The ITC normally has six commissioners, but three vacancies
existed during this proceeding.
75. Id. The ITC vowed not to "change our practice or procedure" and not to "follow the
procedural or substantive decisions" of the panel. Id. at 5, 34.
76. Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Binational Panel Remand Decision II, Article
1904.13 Extraordinary Challenge Committee, No. ECC-91-1904-01 USA (June 14, 1991) (Extraordi-
nary Challenge Dismissed).
77. See, e.g., Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-01, at
A-4 (Jan. 6, 1993) (Comm. Dep't Resp. Br.).
78. The NAFTA affirmatively states that "with respect to the particular matter between the
Parties that is before the panel," the decision of the panel "shall be binding." NAFTA art. 1904(9).
The Statement of Administrative Action of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act provides that panel decisions are not binding precedents on domestic courts, but that
courts may look to such decisions for their "intrinsic persuasiveness." H.R. Doc. No. 216, supra
note 62, at 271. The NAFTA is silent on the extent to which panel decisions may be relied on as prior
applications and interpretations of domestic law by subsequent panels. As a matter of practice, CFTA
panels have frequently cited prior panel decisions and looked to how they construed and applied the
applicable domestic law.
79. CFTA art. 1904(9); NAFTA art. 1904(9).
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they will present an issue that goes to the heart of the Chapter 19 binational panel
process.
VII. The Substantive Quality of the NAFTA Panel Decisions
A careful assessment of the substantive quality of the decisions rendered by
Chapter 19 CFTA panels would be a substantial undertaking, well beyond the
scope of this brief discussion. Any such effort would need to recognize that panel
decisions, like court decisions, are not necessarily of uniform quality. More
importantly, qualitative evaluations, inherently subjective to some extent, are
sometimes colored in the context of contentious trade disputes by the perspective
of the evaluator. Notwithstanding these caveats, and acknowledging the author's
own prior involvement in CFTA Chapter 19 proceedings, 80 the record of the
CFTA panels lends itself to some preliminary observations. The following ones,
if not incontestable, are at least broadly supportable.
First, CFTA Chapter 19 panels, on the whole, have demonstrated a high degree
of conscientiousness and professionalism. Counsel appearing before Chapter 19
panels routinely face panelists who are exceptionally well prepared. Panel deci-
sions frequently include detailed analyses of the relevant law of the importing
Party and careful discussions of the facts. Opinions typically reflect a diligent
effort on the part of the panelists to apply the law fairly and correctly. Indeed,
some of the most thoughtful discussions of difficult issues to appear anywhere-
for example, specificity-are found in opinions of CFTA binational panels.8
Second, panel decisions have tended to be substantively consistent with one
another. Notwithstanding the fact that the composition of panels differs from case
to case, results before Chapter 19 panels have not tended to be either erratic
or contradictory.82 Consistency among panel decisions has undoubtedly been
enhanced by the inclination of panels to cite to earlier panel decisions that they
have found to be particularly persuasive in their analysis or discussion of applica-
ble law. 3
80. In several Chapter 19 proceedings, the author has appeared as counsel to the Government
of Canada.
81. Commentators have, as a result, given panels high marks. See, e.g., Judith H. Bello et al.,
U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 18: Midterm Report on Binational Dispute Settlement Under
the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 25 INT'L LAW. 489, 516 (1991).
82. Compare Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-1904-91-03, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 1
(May 19, 1992) (Dec. of Panel) with Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-1904-91-04, 1992
FTAPD LEXIS 6 (Aug. 26, 1992) (Dec. of the Panel).
83. In Live Swine from Canada, for example, the panel cited to Replacement Parts for Self-
Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-02, at 3-5, 1990
FTAPD LEXIS 2 (Jan. 22, 1990), Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-
1904-11, at 5-13, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 10 (Aug. 24, 1990), New Steel Rails, Except Light Rails,
from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-08, at 6-8, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 5 (Aug. 30, 1990), and
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, Panel No. USA-
90-1904-01, at 13-18, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (May 24, 1991), as well as to U.S. judicial decisions,
for their treatment of the standard of review. Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03,
at 9, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 1 (May 19, 1992) (Dec. of the Panel).
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Third, panels have, quite predictably, not been able to avoid issues of first
impression or issues on which the applicable domestic law is unsettled or contra-
dictory. In such circumstances panels are plainly obliged to do as a domestic court
would do-construe and apply the law as well as possible on the basis of existing
legal authorities. As the case law from CFTA and the NAFTA panels accumulates,
it may thus become an important resource for domestic courts presented with
similar issues. Although panel decisions are not binding precedents, the Parties
have long understood that domestic courts might draw on them. The U.S. imple-
menting legislation for the CFTA, for example, provides that "a court of the
United States is not bound by, but may take into consideration, a final decision
of a binational panel or extraordinary challenge committee convened pursuant to
article 1904 of the Agreement."4
VIII. Extraordinary Challenge Committees and Special
Committees: Safety Valves or Second Chances?
The NAFTA contains two different entities that may be regarded as checks or
safeguards for the Chapter 19 binational panel review process. One, the extraordi-
nary challenge committee, has been a part of the CFTA and, thus, already the
subject of some attention. The other, the special committee, is a new Chapter 19
creation that will be first tested, if at all, in the context of the NAFTA. Each of
these entities guards the binational panel process.
A. EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE COMMITTEES
A panel decision binds the Parties with respect to the matter before it and may
be challenged only in extraordinary circumstances. Such challenges, known as
"extraordinary challenges," are available only if:
(a) i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious
conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct,
ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or
iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction ....
and [the error] has materially affected the panel's decision and threatens
the integrity of the binational panel review process .... "
The NAFTA provides that extraordinary challenges must be filed "within a
reasonable time after the panel decision is issued," thereby leaving it to the Parties
to establish a precise deadline for filing an extraordinary challenge. 6
NAFTA Annex 1904.13 sets out the extraordinary challenge procedure. It
84. H.R. Doc. No. 216, supra note 62, at 123 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1988)); see
also id. at 271 ("Any consideration of a panel or committee decision by a court would be for its
intrinsic persuasiveness as a view regarding U.S. law.").
85. NAFTA art. 1904(13).
86. Id.
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states that extraordinary challenge committees will be composed of three members
that are selected from a fifteen-person roster "comprised of judges or former
judges of a federal judicial court of the United States or ajudicial court of superior
jurisdiction of Canada, or a Federal Judicial Court of Mexico.-1 7 Each Party
names five individuals to the roster. Extraordinary challenges are decided on an
expedited basis. Committees are established within fifteen days of the date on
which a request for an extraordinary challenge is filed and are obliged to issue
decisions within ninety days of being established.
8 8
One of the dramas of the NAFTA will be played out on this stage of extraordi-
nary challenge provisions. Unlike Chapter 19 panels themselves, which must
operate within the general confines of the existing, applicable domestic law,
challenge committees construing and applying article 1904(13) are fashioning a
new jurisprudence. That strain of case law will undoubtedly affect how the Chap-
ter 19 panel process will function. If extraordinary challenge committee decisions
continue to limit recourse to extraordinary challenges to truly extraordinary
abuses of the Chapter 19 panel process, then the arbitral model of nonreviewable
dispute resolution will remain intact.
The tensions over the proper role of extraordinary challenges is already evident.
Thus far, these challengers have arisen solely with respect to panel reviews of
U.S. cases. At least in that context the initial tension has been between a U.S.
desire for broader appellate recourse in cases it believes were wrongly decided
by a panel and a Canadian desire to restrict extraordinary challenges to rare
instances of systemic abuse, such as gross misconduct or ultra vires action.89
B. SPECIAL COMMITTEES
The NAFTA Chapter 19 provisions differ in certain other respects from the
CFTA provisions. For example, the NAFTA provides that a Party may request
consultations with another Party if the application of the other Party's domestic law
(a) has prevented the establishment of a panel requested by the complaining
Party;
(b) has prevented a panel requested by the complaining Party from rendering
a final decision;
(c) has prevented the implementation of the decision of a panel requested by
the complaining Party or denied it binding force and effect with respect to
the particular matter that was before the panel; or
87. NAFTA annex 1904.13(1).
88. Id. 1904.13(1),(2).
89. The most recent catalyst for this debate is a small change in article 1904(13) of the NAFTA
from its CFTA predecessor. Already the United States is arguing that the addition of the phrase
"failing to apply the appropriate standard of review" indicates broader grounds for an extraordinary
challenge. Canada can be expected to argue that the NAFTA only makes explicit what was implicit
in the CFTA, as articulated by the first extraordinary challenge committee.
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(d) has resulted in a failure to provide opportunity for review of a final determi-
nation by a panel or court of competent jurisdiction that is independent of
the competent investigating authorities, that examines the basis for the
investigating authorities' determination and whether the investigating au-
thority properly applied domestic antidumping and countervailing duty law
in reaching the challenged determination, and that employs the relevant
standard of review .... 90
The stated purpose of this elaborate consultation procedure, added for purposes
of the NAFTA, is to prevent any Party from thwarting the panel review system.
If consultations do not resolve the obstruction to the panel process within forty-five
days of the request for consultations (or any other period established by agreement
of the consulting Parties), then the complaining Party may request the establish-
ment of a special committee to review the allegations. If the special committee
finds in favor of the complaining Party and the Parties are not able to reach a
mutually satisfactory solution to the matter within sixty days after the committee's
decision, then the complaining Party may suspend the operation of Chapter 19
with respect to the other Party. This provision, in short, provides for suspension
in case of systemic failure.
IX. Conclusions
As of the early spring of 1993 the climate for trade agreements is a bit stormy.
The NAFTA has been concluded, but not implemented. In the United States the
NAFTA is a political, transition issue for both a new administration and a new
Congress. In Canada the prospect of new elections has revived political debate
about the CFTA, and thus the NAFTA. In all three countries the backdrop is the
fractious and yet unconcluded Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
In such a climate observations about Chapter 19 are both timely and likely to
prove controversial. Nonetheless, some assessment of the pivotal Chapter 19
provisions is essential to any discussion of the NAFTA.
Many might now agree that the Chapter 19 approach to dispute settlement,
particularly in the contentious area of antidumping and countervailing duty law,
is not a modest innovation. A commitment to be bound by binational decisions
made by five-member panels that bridge different legal cultures but apply the law
of just one is a long step from routine appellate review. That it was originally
a compromise does not soften the reality that from time to time Chapter 19 panel
decisions may uncomfortably bind one or both of the contracting Parties.
Second, the commitment to resolve antidumping and countervailing duty dis-
putes according to a rule of law may also be more ambitious than originally
assumed. This complex, specialized area of the law rests on international
agreements that do not embody a detailed consensus among the signatories. Some
90. NAFTA art. 1905(1).
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legal concepts are highly developed only within the framework of U.S. law and
some of those are still inchoate or fluid. To demand consistency, transparency,
and predictability of this system of laws, and of an overburdened bureaucracy,
is to set a high goal.
When viewed in this context, CFTA Chapter 19 panels have, on the whole,
performed impressively. Panel members have exhibited high levels of prepared-
ness, expertise, and conscientiousness. The quality of panel opinions has also
generally been high. And panels have demonstrated an ability to avoid resolving
contentious issues along national lines. These accomplishments reflect well on
both the panelists and those who administer the panel process.
The promise of Chapter 19 is that it will come to be a mutually acceptable
means of resolving inflammatory economic conflicts among the three Parties.
Under the NAFTA, the panel process will build on the experience gained under
the CFTA. If it becomes fully institutionalized, the Chapter 19 process could
ultimately inspire a new effort to achieve the objective that has substantially
eluded the Uruguay Round and been formally abandoned in the NAFTA-the
development of a new set of rules on dumping and subsidies that is comprehensive,
precise, and mutually agreed.
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